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Abstract
We consider the non-orthodox proof rules of hybrid logic from the viewpoint of topological semantics.
Topological semantics is more general than Kripke semantics. We show that the hybrid proof rule BG is
topologically not sound. Indeed, among all topological spaces the BG rule characterizes those that can
be represented as a Kripke frame (i.e., the Alexandroﬀ spaces). We also demonstrate that, when the BG
rule is dropped and only the Name rule is kept, one can prove a general topological completeness result
for hybrid logics axiomatized by pure formulas. Finally, we indicate some limitations of the topological
expressive power of pure formulas. All results generalize to neighborhood frames.
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1 Introduction
In many completeness results for hybrid logics, an important role is played by non-
orthodox rules, i.e., proof rules involving syntactic side-conditions, also known as
Gabbay-style rules. For instance, such rules are necessary in order to obtain general
Kripke completeness for hybrid logics axiomatized by pure formulas [3]. Various
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formulations of these non-orthodox proof rules for hybrid logic have been used in
the literature under names such as COV [9], Name and Paste [4] or BG [3]. Here,
we will consider the following formulation of the rules in the language with the
global modality:
Name If  i → φ then  φ, for i not occurring in φ.
BG If  E(i ∧j) → E(j ∧ φ) then  E(i ∧φ)
for i = j and j not occurring in φ.
The Name rule is very natural. It expresses that whenever a formula φ is falsiﬁable,
one can name the falsifying world by a fresh nominal. The BG rule also seems natu-
ral at ﬁrst. Under the usual Kripke semantics, it expresses that whenever φ holds
at a world, one can pick a fresh nominal to name a witnessing φ-successor. Under
the topological semantics, however, where φ expresses that φ holds throughout
some open neighborhood around the current point, it is not clear why the BG rule
would preserve validity.
This observation forms the starting point of this paper. First, we demonstrate
that the BG rule fails to preserve validity on many topological spaces, including
the real line (Theorem 3.2). In fact, we show (Theorem 3.4) that the BG rule
characterizes those topological spaces that can be represented as Kripke frames
(i.e., the Alexandroﬀ spaces).
Next, we prove that the BG rule can be eliminated from the axiomatization
without sacriﬁcing completeness: every hybrid logic extending S4 by means of pure
formulas, without the BG rule, is complete with respect to some class of topological
spaces (Theorem 4.1). These results generalize to neighborhood frames (Section 6).
Of course, pure formulas have rather limited expressive power: while the sep-
aration axioms T0 and T1 can be deﬁned by means of pure formulas, many other
properties of topological spaces cannot be deﬁned in this way. In fact, in the ab-
sence of BG even the hybrid variant of S4 cannot be axiomatized with pure formu-
las (Corollary 6.4). Nevertheless, the construction used in our completeness proof
seems to work for an interesting class of axioms, not all of which are topologically
equivalent to pure formulas. It is left as an open question how large exactly this
class is.
Concerning the main question of the workshop — what is the proper way to
hybridize a logic? — we can conclude that a crucial decision lies in the choice of
non-orthodox rules. This decision in turn should depend on whether the intended
semantics is topological or graph-like in nature. Whichever choice you make, don’t
worry: hybrid proof mechanisms are going to cater for your needs. There are many
paths to hybrid paradise.
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2 Background
2.1 Hybrid logic and hybrid proof rules
The hybrid language we will consider in this paper H(E) is obtained by enriching
ordinary modal logic with nominals, a second sort of atomic formula, typically
written i, j, k,. . . , and with the global modality E. More precisely, given a countable
set of ordinary proposition letters prop and a countable set of nominals nom, we
deﬁne the formulas of H(E) to be
φ ::= p | i | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ |Eφ
where p ∈ prop and i ∈ nom. Other connectives are introduced as abbreviations.
In particular,  is understood thorough the paper as ¬¬. Nevertheless, later on
it will be sometimes more convenient to introduce some notions treating  as the
basic connective. Sub(φ), the subformula closure of φ is the set of all subformulas
of φ. A substitution instance of φ is deﬁned as usual in propositional logic with the
additional requirement that nominals can be replaced only by nominals. Nominals
act as proposition letters, except that their valuation is required to be a singleton
set. Thus, for example, the hybrid formula (i∧ p)∧(i∧¬p) is unsatisﬁable due
to the fact that i is a nominal. The global modality allows us to express that a
formula holds somewhere in the model: Eφ is true at a point w iﬀ there is a point
v (not necessarily related to w) satisfying φ.
The nominals and the global modality make it possible to deﬁne properties that
are not deﬁnable in the basic modal language. For instance, no formula of the basic
modal language can deﬁne the class of irreﬂexive Kripke frames, but it is easy to see
that i → ¬i is valid on a Kripke frame iﬀ the frame is irreﬂexive. Note that valid
here means true at all worlds in the frame under all valuations that make nominals
true at a unique world. Observe that this formula contains no proposition letters,
only nominals. We call such formulas pure.
One of the great merits of hybrid logic is that there is a general completeness
result for logics axiomatized by pure formulas. This result relies on the use of
non-orthodox proof rules: rules that involve syntactic side-conditions. The full
axiomatization of minimal logic in H(E) is given in Table 1. For any set of formulas
Γ, deﬁne KName,BG
H(E) Γ, to be the smallest set of formulas containing Γ and closed
under all the axioms and rules from Table 1.
Theorem 2.1 Let Γ be any set of pure formulas. Then KName,BG
H(E) Γ is strongly
complete for the class of Kripke frames deﬁned by Γ.
This result crucially depends on the use of non-orthodox proof rules: every ax-
iomatization of which each pure extension is complete must contain either inﬁnitely
many proof rules or non-orthodox ones. [3]
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Table 1
Axioms and rules for H(E)
CT  φ, for all classical tautologies φ
K  (p → q) → p → q
KA  A(p → q) → Ap → Aq
RefE  p → Ep
TransE  EEp → Ep
SymE  p → AEp
Incl  p → Ep
Incli  Ei
Nom  E(i ∧ p)→ A(i → p)
MP If  φ → ψ and  φ then  ψ
Nec If  φ then  φ
NecA If  φ then  Aφ
Subst If  φ then  φσ, where σ is a substitution that uniformly replaces
proposition letters by formulas and nominals by nominals.
Name If  i → φ then  φ, for i not occurring in φ.
BG If  E(i ∧j) → E(j ∧ φ) then  E(i ∧ φ),
for i = j and j not occurring in φ.
2.2 Topological Semantics
Topological spaces are usually deﬁned as pairs 〈T,O〉, consisting of a non-empty set
T (“the points”), and a set O of subsets of T (“the open sets”), such that ∅, T ∈ O
and such that O is closed under arbitrary unions and ﬁnite intersections. For present
purposes, it is convenient to use a slightly diﬀerent presentation.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A topological space is a pair 〈T, τ〉, consisting of a non-empty set
T , and a function τ that assigns to each x ∈ T a set of subsets of T (“the basic
open neighborhoods around x”) satisfying the following properties:
non-emptiness there is some X ∈ τ(x),
ﬁlter X,Y ∈ τ(x) iﬀ X ∩ Y ∈ τ(x),
T for all X ∈ τ(x), x ∈ X,
4 for all X ∈ τ(x), {y ∈ T | X ∈ τ(y)} ∈ τ(x).
In presence of the ﬁlter condition, non-emptiness is equivalent to the requirement
that T ∈ τ(x). For every x ∈ T , τ(x) is called the neighborhood base of x. For any
X ⊆ T , we deﬁne the interior of X, τX, to be the set {x ∈ T | X ∈ τ(x)}. Thus,
4 says that for all X ∈ τ(x),τX ∈ τ(x).
It will become clear in Section 6 why we use this deﬁnition of topological spaces.
The two versions are equivalent, though (cf. any textbook on set-theoretic topology):
Fact 2.3 Given any topological space T := 〈T, τ〉 in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.2, the
family of open sets Oτ := {τX | X ⊆ T} contains ∅ and T and is closed under
arbitrary unions and ﬁnite intersections. Conversely, if O ⊆ ℘(T ) contains ∅ and
T and is closed under arbitrary union and ﬁnite intersections, then
〈T, τO : T  x → {X ⊆ T | ∃Y ∈ O such that x ∈ Y and Y ⊆ X}) ⊆ ℘(T )〉
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is a topological space in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.2. Moreover, 〈T, τOτ 〉 is the same
topological space as 〈T, τ〉.
A topological model 〈T, V 〉 consists of a topological space T and a valuation
function V assigning subsets of T to propositional variables and elements of T to
nominals. Satisfaction of a formula φ at a point x in a topological model 〈T, V 〉
(notation: 〈T, V 〉, x |= φ) is deﬁned as follows:
T, V, x p iﬀ x ∈ V (p)
T, V, x i iﬀ x = V (i)
T, V, x ¬φ iﬀ T, V, x  φ
T, V, x φ ∧ ψ iﬀ T, V, x  φ and T, V, x  ψ
T, V, x φ iﬀ x ∈ τ{y ∈ T | T, V, y  φ}
T, V, x Aφ iﬀ for every y ∈ T , T, V, y  φ
V (φ), as usual, stands for denotation of φ under V . This sometimes creates slight
ambiguity: V (i) can stand either for the element assigned to i by V or for the
corresponding singleton. We will be rather careless here, as it is not likely to create
any confusion.
It is straightforward to see that the S4 axioms p → p and p → p hold
regardless of the valuation (i.e., are valid). Since the work of McKinsey and Tarski
[14], it is known that in the basic modal language (i.e., without universal modality
and nominals) S4 is not only sound but also complete with respect to topological
spaces. Before we prove a more general version of this theorem for hybrid logic, let
us recall why adding nominals is an attractive step from topological perspective.
Example 2.4 The following properties are deﬁnable in H(E):
• T0, i.e., for all x = y, either there is an X ∈ τ(x) such that y ∈ X, or there is an
X ∈ τ(y) such that x ∈ X
is deﬁned by E(i ∧ ¬j) → E(i ∧¬j) ∨ E(j ∧¬i)
• T1, i.e., for all x = y, there is an X ∈ τ(x) such that y ∈ X
is deﬁned by i → i
• density-in-itself, i.e., for every x, {x} ∈ τ(x)
is deﬁned by ¬i
These properties are not deﬁnable in the basic modal language [14,5].
We mentioned earlier that topological spaces generalize Kripke frames. Every
reﬂexive and transitive (that is, quasi-ordered) Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉 gives rise
to a topological space: simply take τR(x) = {X ⊆ W | ∀y(xRy → y ∈ X)}. Not
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every topological space can be represented by a Kripke frame in this way. In fact, a
space is representable by means of a Kripke frame iﬀ every τ(x) contains a smallest
element. Such spaces are called Alexandroﬀ spaces.
Fact 2.5 A space is Alexandroﬀ iﬀ for arbitrary family {Xi}i∈I of subsets of I,
τ
⋂
i∈I
Xi =
⋂
i∈I
τXi or, dually, τ
⋃
i∈I
Xi =
⋃
i∈I
τXi.
There is in fact a category-theoretical equivalence between quasi-orders and
Alexandroﬀ spaces (cf. [8,16]), but we will not go into the details here.
3 Hybrid proof rules from topological perspective
Topological semantics for hybrid logic has received some attention in recent litera-
ture, where it is noticed that several modally undeﬁnable properties of topological
spaces are deﬁnable using nominals. However, not much is known about axiomatics
for hybrid logic under the topological semantics. It is not hard to see that all axioms
of hybrid logic are also sound under the topological interpretation. The Name rule
is also topologically sound:
Theorem 3.1 The Name rule preserves validity on every topological space.
Proof. If φ is falsiﬁed on a topological space T at a point x, then i → φ is falsiﬁed
under the same valuation extended by sending i to x. 
The BG rule, on the other hand, is topologically dangerous even on the most
well known topology, the real line, as the following shows:
Theorem 3.2 The BG rule does not preserve validity on the real line, and, indeed,
on any non-discrete T1 space.
Proof. By Example 2.4, i → i deﬁnes the T1 separation property: for all x = y,
there is an open around x to which y does not belong. Clearly, this formula is valid
on the real line. Using the axioms of hybrid logic, and classical modal inference
rules — which are all topologically sound — we can derive from this
E(j ∧i) → E(i ∧ (E(j ∧ p)→ p))
This indeed deﬁnes the same class as i → i. A single application of the BG rule
now yields
E(j ∧(E(j ∧ p)→ p))
This formula deﬁnes the same class of topological spaces as p → p, namely the
class of all spaces with discrete topology, i.e., topology in which the set of opens
is the full powerset. To see it, assume that T, V, x  p → p. It is enough to set
V (j) := x to refute the above formula. Conversely, assume E(j ∧(E(j ∧ p) → p))
is refuted by V . It can happen only if V (j) ∈ V (p) — otherwise E(j ∧ p) → p
has a false antecedent and hence is true at every point in the space — and yet
V (j) ∈ τV (p). But it means p → p is refuted. Alternatively, one can prove
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syntactically that the two formulas are equivalent using the Name rule, which is
topologically sound by Theorem 3.1.
R  p → p and the conclusion follows. 
Incidentally, by the same argument, almost all interesting topological hybrid
logics are Kripke incomplete:
Corollary 3.3 The hybrid logic of the real line, and in fact the hybrid logic of any
class of T1 spaces containing a non-discrete space, is Kripke incomplete.
Proof. These logics are not closed under the BG rule, whereas every Kripke com-
plete logic is. 
Not surprisingly, the BG rule is sound for Alexandroﬀ topologies, which can be
represented as Kripke frames. In fact, it turns out that the BG rule characterizes
exactly the Alexandroﬀ topologies. Let us say that a space admits BG if every
valuation falsifying the consequent of the BG rule can be extended to a valuation
falsifying the antecedent. 4
Theorem 3.4 A space is Alexandroﬀ iﬀ it admits BG.
Proof. Assume the space is Alexandroﬀ and let T, V |= E(i ∧ φ). Then there is
some y which belongs to the smallest element of τ(V (i)) and does not belong to
V (φ). Deﬁne V ′(j) := y, valuations of all other variables unchanged. It follows that
V ′(i) ∈ V ′(j) and not j ∈ V ′(φ). Thus, the antecedent of the rule is falsiﬁed.
On the other hand, suppose the space is non-Alexandroﬀ. Then there is a point
x s.t. τ(x) contains no smallest element. Deﬁne f : τ(x)  X → {y ∈ X | ∃X ′ ∈
τ(x).y ∈ X ′} ∈ ℘(T ). This is a sequence of sets indexed by elements of τ(x) whose
all elements are non-empty and hence — by the Axiom of Choice — it has a choice
function τ(x)  X → g(X) ∈ T . We may think of {g(X)}X∈τ(x) as of a sequence of
elements approximating x s.t. (1) for every X ∈ τ(x), x ∈ τ{g(X)} and yet (2)
x ∈ τg[τ(x)]. Deﬁne V (i) := x, V (p) := T − g[τ(x)] (complement of the range of
g). Then by (2) T, V, x  E(i ∧p) but by (1) for no valuation V ′ agreeing with V
on i and p it is the case that T, V ′, x  E(i ∧j) → E(j ∧ p). 
Alexandroﬀ spaces do not form a particularly interesting class of spaces, and
therefore, from a topological perspective, the BG rule is rather ad hoc. Inspired
by Theorem 3.4, one could consider variations of the rule. For instance, it can be
naturally weakened as follows:
BG′ From E(i ∧j) → E(j ∧φ) for j ∈ Sub(φ), infer E(i ∧φ)
Indeed, this new rule turns out to deﬁne a strictly weaker property than that of
Alexandroﬀness.
Theorem 3.5 All Alexandroﬀ spaces admit the BG′ rule but not vice versa. Not
every space admits BG′.
4 This deﬁnition is inspired somewhat by similar notions used in [3,17]. An alternative would be to require
only that the logic of the class in question is closed under the BG rule. However, under this weaker notion
of admittance, rules such as the BG rule are not likely to characterize any interesting semantic property.
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Proof. One direction of the ﬁrst claim is trivial. The other direction: consider the
real numbers and as non-trivial open sets take all intervals (r, r′) with r < 0 < r′.
This space is easily seen to admit BG′. It fails to be Alexandroﬀ though, as the
element 0 has no smallest open neighborhood.
To see that not every space admits BG′, consider the real line with standard
topology. The element 0 is in the closure of the open interval (0, 1) but it is not in
the closure of any singleton from this interval. 
Still, topologically the most natural move is to drop the BG rule completely.
As the next section shows, this is indeed a feasible option. Every hybrid logic
axiomatized by pure formulas is topologically complete without the BG rule.
Remark 3.6 Using the techniques of [6], it can be shown that hybrid logics axiom-
atized with modal Sahlqvist formulas are all Kripke complete. In case of extensions
of S4H(E), this entails completeness with respect to a class of Alexandroﬀ topolo-
gies, even without the Name and BG rules. It follows by Theorem 3.1 that the
Name rule is admissible, and by Theorem 3.4 that the BG rule is admissible in
these logics.
4 Completeness of pure extensions
In this section, we show that all hybrid logics axiomatized by pure formulas are
topologically complete. This generalizes known results for Kripke semantics. The
most important diﬀerence with these known results is that, in the topological se-
mantics, we cannot make use of the BG rule, as it is topologically unsound. Instead,
we will only use the Name rule. Recall that KName,BG
H(E) Γ, was deﬁned to be the
smallest set of formulas containing Γ and closed under all the axioms and rules from
Table 1. KName
H(E) Γ is deﬁned similarly, but we do not require closure under BG. We
will use S4NameH(E) Γ as a shorthand for K
Name
H(E) (Γ ∪ {p → p,p → p}).
We say that a hybrid logic S4NameH(E) Γ is strongly complete with respect to a class
K of topological spaces if every S4NameH(E) Γ-consistent set of formulas can be jointly
satisﬁed (at some point, under some valuation) on a space in K. Then, the main
result of this section is the following:
Theorem 4.1 For every set Γ of pure H(E) formulas, S4NameH(E) Γ is strongly com-
plete with respect to the class of topological spaces deﬁned by Γ.
We will make use of the following variant of The Lindenbaum Lemma [12].
Lemma 4.2 Let Γ be any set of hybrid formulas. Every KName
H(E) Γ-consistent set of
formulas Δ can be extended to a KName
H(E) Γ-consistent set of formulas Δ
+ satisfying
the following conditions:
• Δ+ contains all formulas from KName
H(E) Γ and a fresh nominal j,
• for every φ, exactly one of {φ,¬φ} belongs to Δ+,
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• for every Eψ ∈ Δ+, there is a nominal i which does not appear in ψ such that
E(i ∧ ψ) ∈ Δ+.
The last condition could be baptized weak namedness. We may also say that
Δ+ is pasted for E-modality.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 we will give resembles the well-known Henkin con-
struction in ﬁrst-order completeness proofs.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let Γ be any set of pure formulas, and Δ a S4NameH(E) Γ-
consistent set of formulas. Let Δ+ be obtained from Δ using Lemma 4.2. We will
construct a topological model T := (T, τ, V ) out of equivalence classes of nominals
in Δ+.
As the universe T , we pick the set of all ≡Δ+-equivalence classes of nominals,
where i ≡Δ+ j iﬀ E(i ∧ j) ∈ Δ
+. The reader may check that this is indeed an
equivalence relation.
For every [i] ∈ T , we deﬁne τ([i]) as the set of all X ⊆ T for which there exists
a formula φ such that E(i ∧ φ) ∈ Δ+ and {[j] ∈ T | E(j ∧ φ) ∈ Δ+} ⊆ X. In
other words, X is open if every point of X has an open neighborhood contained in
X: namely, a suitable neighborhood of the equivalence class of i is deﬁned by some
φ s.t. according to Δ+ (a) φ holds at i and (b) every equivalence class where φ
holds belongs to X.
The valuation V is deﬁned by letting V (p) := {[i] ∈ T | E(i ∧ p) ∈ Δ+} and
V (i) := [i].
Claim 4.3 τ satisﬁes the non-emptiness and ﬁlter conditions.
Proof. It follows from the deﬁnition of τ that, for every [i], T ∈ τ([i]). Next,
assume that X,Y ∈ τ([i]). It means there are appropriate formulas φX and φY
witnessing the membership. But then φX ∧ φY shows that X ∩ Y ∈ τ([i]). 
Claim 4.4 τ satisﬁes conditions T and 4.
Proof. Assume [i] ∈ τX. This means that there is a suitable φX s.t. E(i∧φX) ∈
Δ+. Now:
(i) Because of the T axiom and the assumption on φX , it means [i] ∈ X, thus
τX ⊆ X.
(ii) To show that τX ⊆ ττX, it is enough to set φX := φX and use the
axiom 4.

Claim 4.5 (Truth) For every φ and i, T, [i]  φ iﬀ E(i ∧ φ) ∈ Δ+.
Proof. By induction. The interesting clause is the one for . It follows from the
deﬁnition of τ that T, [i]  φ holds iﬀ
there is ψ such that E(i ∧ ψ) ∈ Δ+ and for every j, E(j ∧ ψ) ∈ Δ+ implies
T, [j]  φ
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Using the induction hypothesis and the weak namedness of Δ+ (cf. Lemma 4.2) one
can show that this holds iﬀ there is ψ such that E(i∧ψ) ∈ Δ+ and A(ψ → φ) ∈ Δ+.
Clearly, the latter holds iﬀ E(i ∧ φ) ∈ Δ+ (in one direction, pick ψ = φ, and in
the other direction, use the KA and Incl axioms). The clause for A also requires
weak namedness; we leave the details to the reader. 
In particular, it follows that the point [j] satisﬁes all formulas in Δ.
All that remains is to check that all substitution instances of formulas in Γ hold
at every point in T. But each such substitution instance φ belongs to the logic, and
hence, by the NecA rule and the fact that Δ
+ is an MCS, Aφ ∈ Δ+, and hence, by
Claim 4.5, T |= φ. 
In Section 7, we brieﬂy discuss how this result can be extended to other hybrid
languages.
This proof is a hybrid of the Henkin-style technique of named models and the
original McKinsey-Tarski topological completeness result for S4 in the basic modal
language [14]. Aiello et al. [1] give a proof analogous to the one of McKinsey
and Tarski, but formulated directly in terms of MCS’s rather than in the language
of algebra. The topological space TL := 〈TL, τL〉 is constructed out of MCS’s in
the basic modal language without any non-standard rules. For every such MCS
Γ, τL(Γ) := {X ⊆ TL | {Δ | φ ∈ Δ} ⊆ X for some φ ∈ Γ}. Both our proof
and the one for the basic modal language take ’to be a base open set’ to mean
’to be an extension of some φ’, but here instead of dealing with all MCS’s, we
work only with equivalence classes of nominals — and, in addition, this equivalence
relation is deﬁned with respect to a single MCS. The relationship of our named
topological models with those canonical topological ones can be compared then to
the one between named Kripke models (in the language with the BG rule) and the
standard canonical model construction.
Remark 4.6 TL is a subtopology of the Stone topology on all MCS’s and hence
must be, for example, dense-in-itself (see, e.g., [1]). However, as follows from Ex-
ample 2.4, density-in-itself is deﬁnable in H(E). Hence, the hybrid logic of spaces
which are dense-in-itself is a proper extension of S4NameH(E) . This alone shows that
topology deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 4.1 has diﬀerent properties than TL and
is not always homeomorphic to it.
Remark 4.7 Theorem 5.2 in Bezhanishvili et al. [2] suggests that the McKinsey-
Tarski construction in the basic modal language does not work for proper exten-
sions of S4. The authors introduce topo-canonical extensions of arbitrary closure
algebras (similar to canonical extensions, which generalize the canonical model con-
struction to arbitrary, not necessarily free, modal algebras), and show that these
topo-canonical extensions do not preserve any equation corresponding to an axiom
properly extending S4.
This does not yet imply that the McKinsey-Tarski construction must fail for all
extensions of S4 in the basic modal language: this would require showing that the
topological spaces obtained this way from free (Lindenbaum-Tarski) closure algebras
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do not verify any formulas besides those in S4. Still, it seems that the McKinsey-
Tarski construction does need the presence of individual names in the syntax to
reveal its true potential.
5 Euclidean spaces
Probably the most well known examples of topological spaces are the real line R and
its ﬁnite powers Rn equipped with Euclidean topology. McKinsey and Tarski [14]
proved that the modal logic of each of these spaces is S4, which is also the modal
logic of the class of all topological spaces. In particular, none of the interesting
topological properties of the real line can be detected in the basic modal language.
In hybrid logic, the situation is quite diﬀerent: the lower separation properties T0
and T1 are deﬁnable using nominals and the global modality, and Corollary 3.3
shows that logics of Euclidean spaces are not even Kripke complete.
At present, we do not have a complete axiomatization of the hybrid logic of the
real line. However, for n ≥ 2 Kudinov [10] presents an axiomatization of the logic
of Rn in the language equipped with the diﬀerence modality. These two languages
(viz. the modal language with the diﬀerence modality and the hybrid language
with the global modality) are closely related. In particular, they have the same
expressive power on topological spaces [12]. The axioms proposed by Kudinov can
be translated into the hybrid language as follows:
T1-separation i → i,
density-in-itself ¬i,
connectedness A(p ∨¬p)→ Ap ∨ A¬p,
l1-connectedness i ∧(¬i → q ∨¬q)→ (¬i → q) ∨(¬i → ¬q)
The proof of Kudinov’s completeness result has not yet been published. But
even without access to the details of this proof, we can apply the correspondence
results of [12] in order to derive that the hybrid logic axiomatized by the above four
axioms (and with the Name rule) must also be complete with respect to the same
topological spaces as the logic of Kudinov — assuming, of course, that this logic is
topo-complete as intended.
Remark 5.1 In an already published paper, Kudinov [11] proves an intermediate
result: that the diﬀerence logics of dense-in-itself spaces and dense-in-itself T1 spaces
are axiomatizable by the diﬀerence analogues of H(E)-formulas above. As the suit-
able hybrid formulas are pure, this can be obtained as a corollary of Theorem 4.1,
Example 2.4 and translation results of Litak [12]. However, Kudinov’s axiomatiza-
tion does not use any non-standard rules: not even the diﬀerence version of Name.
It is also worth mentioning that for all systems under consideration [11] proves also
the ﬁnite model property with respect to a certain non-standard semantics.
Note that the two last formulas in the above list are not pure. Indeed, the hybrid
logic of Rn, for any n ∈ ω, cannot be axiomatized using only pure formulas:
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Theorem 5.2 No two dense-in-itself T1-spaces are distinguishable by means of pure
formulas. In particular, connectedness is not deﬁnable by means of pure formulas.
Proof. This follows from a more general result: every pure H(E) axiom has a
correspondent in LI , the topological language that extends ﬁrst-order logic with
formulas of the form [Ixφ](y) (“y belongs to the interior of the set deﬁned by φ(x)”).
Makowsky and Ziegler [13] proved that LI formulas cannot distinguish dense-in-
itself T1-spaces. See [5] for more information on the relation between hybrid logics
and LI .
We also give a direct proof of Theorem 5.2 here as it is going to be generalized
in Section 6.
Let T and T′ be dense-in-itself T1-spaces, and suppose for the sake of contradic-
tion that T |= φ and T′ |= φ for some pure formula φ. Then there are V ′ and w′
such that T′, V ′, w′ |= φ. Let V be any valuation for T that sends any two nominals
to the same point iﬀ V ′ does, and let w be any element of T such that w and w′
agree on the nominals they satisfy. An induction argument shows that the following
facts hold for all pure formulas ψ:
(i) Both in 〈T, V 〉 and 〈T′, V ′〉, ψ holds either at ﬁnitely or at coﬁnitely many
points
(ii) T, V  ψ iﬀ T′, V ′  ψ
(iii) ψ holds at coﬁnitely many points at 〈T, V 〉 iﬀ ψ holds at coﬁnitely many
points at 〈T′, V ′〉
(iv) ψ holds at ﬁnitely many points at 〈T, V 〉 iﬀ ψ holds at ﬁnitely many points
at 〈T′, V ′〉
(v) T, V  ¬ψ iﬀ T′, V ′  ¬ψ
For atomic formulas this follows by construction of the valuation. The inductive
steps for the Boolean connectives and E are straightforward. For , we use the fact
that in every T1 dense-in-itself space, τX =  for every coﬁnite set and τX = X
for every ﬁnite set.
It follows that T, V, w |= φ, and hence T |= φ. A contradiction.
For the second part of the result, note that some T1 dense-in-itself spaces are
connected (like R), others are not. Take for example the set [0, 1) ∪ [2, 3) with the
topology induced from R. 
Corollary 5.3 The logic of Rn for any n ∈ ω is not axiomatizable by pure formulas.
6 Neighborhood semantics
While the topological semantics clearly generalizes Kripke semantics, it does so
only for logics above S4. In this section, we consider another semantics for modal
and hybrid logics, that coincides with the topological semantics for logics above
S4, but that also applies to logics below S4. This semantics is known as normal
neighborhood semantics or Scott-Montague semantics. In this section, we will show
that our results can be generalized to this setting.
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A normal neighborhood frame 〈T, τ〉 consists of a non-empty set T and a function
τ : T → ℘(℘(T )) s.t. for every x ∈ T , τ(x) = ∅ and X,Y ∈ τ(x) iﬀ X∩Y ∈ τ(x). In
other words, we require that τ assigns to every element a ﬁlter over W . This makes
the frames under consideration suitable for normal modal logics, hence the name we
use here. The deﬁnitions of valuations, normal neighborhood models, satisfaction,
etc., are analogous to those in the topological case.
Neighborhood frames have been particularly useful in a non-normal setting, i.e.,
for logics which do not contain some instance of K or are not closed under Nec.
Remark 6.5 below discusses the possibility of weakening KName
H(E) along these lines.
In the rest of this section however, unless otherwise speciﬁed, we will only consider
normal neighborhood frames, and omit the qualiﬁcation ‘normal’.
A careful inspection of the proof of Theorem 4.1 reveals that there was only one
place where we used the S4 axioms: in the proof of Claim 4.4. It follows that The-
orem 4.1 can be generalized to neighborhood semantics, obtaining neighborhood
completeness of all hybrid logics axiomatized by pure formulas, not necessarily ex-
tending S4. More precisely,
Theorem 6.1 For every set of pure H(E) formulas Γ, KName
H(E) Γ is sound and com-
plete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames deﬁned by Γ.
Proof. It is just the proof of Theorem 4.1 with Claim 4.4 removed. Details are left
to the reader. 
One might wonder if Theorem 4.1 could have been derived as a corollary of
Theorem 6.1. Recall that KName,BG
H(E) {p → p,p → p} = K
Name,BG
H(E) {i →
i,i → i}. That is, the class of quasi-orders is deﬁnable in the class of all
Kripke frames by means of pure formulas. The surprising thing is that this statement
is no longer true when Kripke frames are replaced by neighborhood frames and
quasi-orders by topological spaces. The axiom T is unproblematic:
Fact 6.2 The following are equivalent for every neighborhood frame T := 〈T, τ〉:
(i) T  p → p,
(ii) T  i → i,
(iii) For every x ∈ T and every X ∈ τ(x), x ∈ X.
The situation with the axiom 4 is diﬀerent, though.
Theorem 6.3 No two neighborhood frames where i ↔ i and ¬i hold are distin-
guishable by pure formulas.
Proof. Exactly the same as Theorem 5.2. 
Corollary 6.4 Neither the condition 4 nor the property of being a topological space
are deﬁnable by means of pure formulas.
Proof. Fix an inﬁnite sequence of disjoint inﬁnite subsets of natural numbers
{An}n∈N. For every An, there exists a non-principal ultraﬁlter Fn containing An.
For every n, let τ(n) := {{n} ∪ X | X ∈ Fn}. For every n, τ¬{n} = N − {n}
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and τ{n} = ∅, and thus 〈N, τ〉 validates the same pure formulas as every T1
dense-in-itself topological space. In particular, it validates i ↔ i and ¬i. But
τ ({n} ∪ An) = {n} and hence ττ ({n} ∪ An) = ∅. Thus, 〈N, τ〉  p → p
and 〈N, τ〉 is not a topological space. 
Hence, the construction used in the proof of Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 applies also
to important logics which are not axiomatizable by means of pure formulas — like
K4NameH(E) or S4
Name
H(E) . As was mentioned in the introduction, it would be interesting
to investigate how large exactly this class is.
Remark 6.5 It is possible to generalize this completeness result to a reasonably
well-behaved class of hybrid non-normal logics with the universal modality. Drop-
ping or weakening K and/or Nec on the syntactic side would simply correspond
to dropping or weakening non-emptiness and ﬁlter conditions on the semantic
side. In the language with E, if we do not want non-normal frames to satisfy the
non-emptiness condition, we also have to drop Incl. Other axioms and rules
can remain unchanged, as they do not involve . Now, careful analysis of the proof
of Theorem 4.1 reveals that Claim 4.5 uses the following theorem of KName
H(E) :
E(p ∧q) ∧ A(q → r)→ E(p ∧r),
which on the basis of axioms for E is equivalent to
A(q → r)→ A(q → r)
(substitute ¬r for p, the converse direction is left as an exercise) and this in turn
is equivalent to
MA A(q → r)→ (q → r).
This axiom forces closure under the rule
Mon If  ψ → χ, then  ψ → χ.
Logics satisfying Mon are called monotonic [7]. Neigbourhood frames for mono-
tonic logics satisfy the following weakening of ﬁlter condition:
supplementation X,Y ∈ τ(x) if X ∩ Y ∈ τ(x).
On the other hand, it is straightforward to observe thatMA is sound with respect
to supplemented frames. Hence, we can conclude that
• the axiomatization consisting of MA and those axioms and rules of K
Name
H(E) which
do not involve  gives the minimal monotonic H(E)-logic and that
• every monotonic H(E)-logic axiomatized with a set of pure formulas Γ is complete
with respect to the class of supplemented neighborhood frames deﬁned by Γ.
Let us now round oﬀ our discussion and ask what is the role of BG in neighbor-
hood semantics. After everything we learned about its role in topological spaces,
the answer should be easy to guess.
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A neighborhood frame is augmented if for arbitrary family {Xi}i∈I of subsets
of I, τ
⋂
i∈I
Xi =
⋂
i∈I
τXi or, dually, τ
⋃
i∈I
Xi =
⋃
i∈I
τXi. Just like in case of
Alexandroﬀ spaces, it is easily seen to be equivalent to the following formulation:
Fact 6.6 A neighborhood frame is augmented iﬀ every τ(x) contains a smallest
element.
The relationship between Kripke frames and augmented neighborhood frames is
exactly the same as relationship between quasi-orders and Alexandroﬀ spaces. In
other words, there is a category-theoretical equivalence between Kripke frames and
augmented neighborhood frames. We refer the reader to [7,8,16] for details.
Theorem 6.7 A neighborhood frame is augmented iﬀ it admits BG.
Proof. Exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 3.4 
Again, one could look for variations or weakenings of the BG rule, analogous to
the BG′ rule discussed in Section 3.
7 Other hybrid languages
At the time of the workshop, it was not immediately clear to us whether our com-
pleteness result could be adapted to hybrid languages that lack the global modality,
such as H(@). Recently, an elegant completeness proof for H(@) was found by
Katsuhiko Sano. It is currently being prepared for publication as a separate note
[15].
Complete axiomatizations are also obtainable for some extensions of H(E) using
the technique of local deﬁnability. Certain operators not deﬁnable in H(E) are
nevertheless “deﬁnable at named points”. Examples include the derivative operator
, which is locally deﬁned by @i(φ ↔ (φ ∧ ¬i)), and the ↓ binder, which is
locally deﬁned by @i(↓x.φ(x) ↔ φ(i)). As explained in [3], whenever an operator is
locally deﬁnable in a hybrid language such as H(E), one can add the relevant local
deﬁnition to the axiomatization of this language, and obtain an axiomatization for
the enriched language that is not only complete, but again complete for arbitrary
pure extensions.
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